Ideas from 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism' by Bertrand Russell [1918], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Russell's Logical Atomism' by Russell,Bertrand (ed/tr Pears,David) [Fontana 1972,-]].

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science

6095	The business of metaphysics is to describe the world

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor

6106	Reducing entities and premisses makes error less likely

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths

6090	Facts make propositions true or false, and are expressed by whole sentences

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths

18348

Not only atomic truths, but also general and negative truths, have truth-makers [Rami]

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets

6103	Normally a class with only one member is a problem, because the class and the member are identical

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form

6092	In a logically perfect language, there will be just one word for every simple object

6101	Romulus does not occur in the proposition 'Romulus did not exist'

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names

6102	You can understand 'author of Waverley', but to understand 'Scott' you must know who it applies to

10423

There are a set of criteria for pinning down a logically proper name [Sainsbury]

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive

7744	Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions [McCullogh]

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names

10426

A name has got to name something or it is not a name

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics

6104	Numbers are classes of classes, and hence fictions of fictions

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms

21708

Russell's new logical atomist was of particulars, universals and facts (not platonic propositions) [Linsky,B]

19051

Russell's atomic facts are actually compounds, and his true logical atoms are sense data [Quine]

6089	Logical atomism aims at logical atoms as the last residue of analysis

6100	Once you have enumerated all the atomic facts, there is a further fact that those are all the facts

6105	Logical atoms aims to get down to ultimate simples, with their own unique reality

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts

21709

You can't name all the facts, so they are not real, but are what propositions assert

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact

18376

Russell asserts atomic, existential, negative and general facts [Armstrong]

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs

5465	Modern trope theory tries, like logical atomism, to reduce things to elementary states [Ellis]

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment

6060	'Existence' means that a propositional function is sometimes true

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity

6099	Modal terms are properties of propositional functions, not of propositions

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation

6098	Perception goes straight to the fact, and not through the proposition

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error

6097	The theory of error seems to need the existence of the non-existent

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates

9022	Russell uses 'propositional function' to refer to both predicates and to attributes [Quine]

19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions

6091	Propositions don't name facts, because each fact corresponds to a proposition and its negation

19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions

21702

In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts' [Quine]

19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique

6094	An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions

6096	I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods

21712

I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday

19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language

6093	The names in a logically perfect language would be private, and could not be shared

28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique

6119	You can discuss 'God exists', so 'God' is a description, not a name